道德對待動物的理由之探究──在道德個體主義與整體主義之間
作者:梁奮程(東海大學哲學系助理教授)
卷期:69卷第2期
日期:2024年9月
頁碼:79-98
DOI:https://doi.org/10.6210/JNTNU.202409_69(2).0004
摘要:
本文的主要目的在探究道德對待動物之理由,主張在「基於能力的理由」、「基於關係的理由」與「基於自然環境價值的理由」之外,還有「基於固有價值的理由」以及「基於能力進路的理由」,而且這五個道德對待動物的理由可以成為一個理由光譜,動物倫理研究順著這個光譜可以進一步拓展道德對待動物之理由。本文在論述的過程中,將陸續展示這些不同理由所遭遇的困難,以及後續的理由論述如何更加完備地處理這個問題。本文認為納斯邦(Martha C. Nussbaum)的能力進路是截至目前為止道德對待動物之最適切的理由,因為它考量到動物多樣性與差異性,不純然只把動物當作工具看待,根據不同物種的動物性賦予牠們尊嚴,而且其道德理由保護動物的範圍非常廣大與多樣。
關鍵詞:內在價值、固有價值、物種規範、個體主義、能力進路
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Journal directory listing - Volume 69 (2024) - Journal of NTNU【69(2)】September
An Inquiry into the Reasons for the Moral Treatment of Animals: Between Moral Individualism and Holism
Author: Fan-Ching Leung ( Department of Philosophy, Tunghai University, Assistant Professor )
Vol.&No.:Vol. 69, No. 2
Date:September 2024
Pages:79-98
DOI:https://doi.org/10.6210/JNTNU.202409_69(2).0004
Abstract:
The main purpose of this article is to explore the reasons for the moral treatment of animals. It asserts that, in addition to “capacity-based reasons,” “relation-based reasons,” and “natural environmental value-based reasons,” there are also “inherent-value-based reasons” and reasons from the Capabilities Approach. These five reasons for the moral treatment of animals can form a spectrum of reasons, which can further expand the moral justification for the treatment of animals when explored along this spectrum. Throughout the discussion, the article will demonstrate the difficulties encountered by these different reasons and how subsequent doctrines can more comprehensively address these issues. The article posits that Martha C. Nussbaum’s Capability Approach is currently the most appropriate reason for the moral treatment of animals, as it considers the diversity and differences of animals, does not merely regard animals as means, accords them dignity based on the animality of different species, and its moral reasoning can protect a wide and diverse range of animals.
Keywords:intrinsic value, inherent value, species norm, individualism, capabilities approach